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Russian Officer Defects to U.S., Reveals Spy Ring

Woman Agent In Germany Hangs Herself

By Dan Morgan
Washington Post Foreign Service

BONN, Oct. 16—A Soviet lieutenant-colonel has defected to the United States after exposing to Western authorities a Russian spy ring operating in West Germany.

In a day of extraordinary revelations connected with the cracking of the spy ring, the West German government made these disclosures:

• The Soviet officer, Yevgeniy Yevgeniyevich Runge, an officer in the Russian KGB (secret service), had been tak-

spy ring to the Soviet government.]

Under the indictment being drawn up by the prosecutor's office, Martin said, it will be alleged that Mrs. Suetterlin, a Foreign Office secretary since 1959, had taken documents to her home at lunch time to be photographed for the past five years.

Her husband, Heinz, a photographer, was also arrested as part of the conspiracy.

According to the chief prosecutor, the rest of the ring was made up of a messenger at the French Embassy, Leopold Pieschel, who is suspected of obtaining a key to the embassy's military liaison office and photographing "secret" and "NATO secret" documents.

Used Soviet Camera

He did this with a special camera built into a cigarette case—which, according to the prosecutor, was a Soviet device. Pieschel had only to pass the device over a document to record it on microfilm.

Also arrested along with the Suetterlins and Pieschel was Pieschel's brother-in-law, a 41-year-old waiter who, according to the prosecutor's office had bugged hotel conference rooms in downtown Bonn. He is suspected of having recruited Pieschel.

"We have all elements of full treasonable activities in evidence before us," Martin said.

There is no death penalty in Germany, but treason suspects can get up to 15 years in prison.

The suicide of Mrs. Suetterlin was announced almost as an afterthought at the press conference. Martin said he regretted that the death would leave certain gaps in the evidence. In her capacity as secretary in the personnel section of the Foreign Office, she presumably had access to records on high-ranking diplomats and other secret data.

Today's announcement of alleged Soviet espionage activities was the latest in a series of developments that are fast earning West Germany the reputation as the most infested country in Europe.

Others Arrested

Last month the government announced the cracking of five East German spy rings here, with the arrest of 12 agents. Suetterlin is himself thought to have crossed over from East Germany.

The Interior Ministry announced recently that some 16,000 agents are thought to be working here.

Disclosures earlier this summer that South Korean intelligence workers had been involved in the disappearance of several South Koreans caused a scandal here and almost led to the expulsion of the South Korean ambassador.

Few Precedents

However, the case today is one of the few involving Soviet activity. At the end of 1965 a German scientist was picked up in Aachen while handing over material to his Soviet "control," but otherwise these incidents have been rare.

It is also an open secret that a Russian diplomat presently assigned as minister counselor to Bonn, Sergei Kudryavtsev, has long been active in political action. As former ambassador to Cuba, he supervised installation of the Soviet missiles there in 1962.

SPECIAL REPORT
BONN

A Covey of Spies Is Flushed in Germany

Soviet agent Heinz Sütterlin (right) posed as a photographer fond of the good life. Spy Martin Marggraf (below) served embassy parties as "the perfect waiter."

A waiter, a janitor, a photographer and a secretary were charged with spying for the Soviet Union in West Germany after the dramatic defection of high-ranking Soviet agent Yevgeny Runge. This account of the latest cold war espionage episode was compiled from reports by TIME *Correspondent Michael Dobbam in Bonn and* TIME-LIFE *Correspondent Jess Cook in Washington.*

Martin Marggraf was a waiter's waiter. He worked at the best restaurants in Bonn, and he was often in demand to serve at the cocktail parties and receptions which pass for evening entertainment in the diplomatic community of any capital city. "He is the perfect waiter," an employer said of him. "He sees nothing and he hears nothing."

This estimate, as it turned out, was ingenuous—and 100% wrong. On Oct. 11 Marggraf was arrested by the West German federal police and accused of spying for the Soviet Union. The government charged that Marggraf not only saw and heard plenty with his own eyes and ears, but that he also had put electronic bugs at the diplomatic functions he served so impeccably.

The arrest broke the most newsworthy espionage story in years. Three other accused spies were picked up. Marggraf's brother-in-law, Leopold Pioschel, a janitor at the French military mission in Bonn; Heinz Sütterlin, who posed as a freelance photographer, and his wife Leonore, a well-placed secretary in the West German foreign office. They were all arrested within five hours after Lt. Colonel Yevgeny Yevgenyevich Runge, a high-ranking operative in the Soviet intelligence system, defected to the West with his wife and 8-year-old son.

Runge himself was the biggest catch of all. Posing as a jukebox salesman, he had directed an operation which had intercepted nearly every code, every piece of correspondence and every secret in the Bonn foreign office and in the French embassy. As soon as they crossed into

CONTINUED

An agent's assignment: marry the secretary

SPYING (CONTINUED)

As a roving cameraman, Sütterlin (above) was free to photograph official functions like the civil defense exercise he is shown covering below. But his true assignment was to copy secret papers which his wife Leonore (right), a secretary in the West German foreign ministry, brought home during lunch hour.

West Berlin. U.S. agents rushed the Runges aboard a plane for America—and no wonder.

A stocky, 39-year-old Ukrainian of German extraction, Runge had worked for the Soviet KGB since 1949 and had spent 12 years in West Germany. The two nets he directed, the Marggraf-Pieschel operation in the Frgach mission and that of the Sütterlins at the foreign office, apparently had no knowledge of each other. The Sütterlin net was the more profitable—so much so, in fact, that several years ago Runge was ordered to concentrate on that, turning the waiter and janitor over to another agent.

Sometime prior to February of this year U.S. intelligence got onto Runge. He agreed to cooperate, but only if his wife and son were taken to the U.S. with him. Then, in February, he was transferred first to East Germany, then to Moscow, where he was given a citation for his accomplishments and put to work lecturing fledgling agents. Somehow—just how will have to wait for someone's declassified memoirs—the Russians were tricked into sending the whole family back to West Berlin. Then, exit Runge, and the swish of the net around the Sütterlins, Pieschel and the perfect waiter.

Spy-catching brings out one-upmanship in governments. After Runge's defection and the subsequent arrests, the Soviets in retaliation released an excerpt from a book purportedly written by a former CIA agent named John Smith. Smith's book, according to the Moscow newspaper *Literary Gazette*, describes U.S. intelligence operations in India during the 1950s. The Soviets said he defected to Russia. Though a John Smith did work in India for the State Department during that time, a U.S. intelligence spokesman said he never worked for the CIA.

Runge, meanwhile, was labeled an "unscrupulous criminal" by the East German government. As for the janitor Pieschel, his job was to photograph documents he found in a safe in the military section of the French embassy. Finding them was no problem; he duplicated the safe key in 1958. Ordered to concentrate on documents with the highest NATO security classifications, he photographed them with a sophisticated "roll-over camera," which records papers line by line as it rolls along a page.

High-level spying at basement wages

SPYING CONTINUED

The most pathetic member of the cast was 39-year-old Leonore Sütterlin. She had a high-security job in the foreign office's administrative section, and she was one of three women on the list the Soviets gave Heinz Sütterlin with instructions to seduce and if necessary—marry. Heinz followed orders, and he and Leonore got married in 1960. Shortly thereafter she was promoted to a better job, and with it went a key to the boss's safe. Beginning in 1962, she brought documents home at lunchtime for her husband to photograph before she climbed back into a Volkswagen and returned to work.

Leonore, whose code name was Lola, seemed nonplussed after her arrest, even after she learned the real reason Sütterlin had married her. She joked with guards and asked a lot of questions about prison routine. But within a week she tied her prison pajamas around her neck and hanged herself in her cell at Klingelpütz prison in Cologne.

Not one relative showed up for the funeral of foreign office secretary Leonore Sütterlin, who hanged herself after learning Sütterlin had married her only to use her.

The Sütterlins lived in a modern $30,000 six-room home which they filled with antique furniture (plus a framed photograph of Konrad Adenauer). A neighbor recalled that when Heinz was hospitalized recently, Leonore confessed that "if anything ever happened to Heinz, I wouldn't be able to go on living." The neighbor assumed they were happily married, but added, "She did seem to love him more than he loved her, but that's always the way with men, isn't it?" After their arrest neighbors noticed the seal of the criminal police at the Sütterlins' door, but they thought it was a joke.

Despite the Sütterlins' prosperity, the espionage business was apparently not very lucrative for the Marggrafs and Pieschels. Marggraf and his wife lived with Mrs. Marggraf's mother and drove an old car. The Pieschels paid $20 a month to rent three dark, dank rooms on the ground floor of a 100-year-old house, and Mrs. Pieschel cleaned the staircase and sometimes neighbors' apartments for extra money. Marggraf's wife, so shocked by the news about her husband that she was under heavy sedation for several days afterward, described him as a perfect husband who "did everything around the house himself," even hanging wallpaper.

With an estimated 5,000 undercover agents at large in West Germany, the press and public are difficult to startle with spy stories. When it finally was made public, the Runge case ranked as only a slight scandal. Leonore's suicide, however, made headlines. A German-American intelligence team is still adding up the damage in what a West German prosecutor has called "the most important case of espionage in the history of the federal republic."

It seems unlikely that any important NATO secrets are still secret. But the most poignant—and potentially dangerous—fact to emerge from the whole episode is that Leonore Sütterlin was only one of three women in sensitive places whom the Soviets believed vulnerable to ideological conversion by romance. That means there are at least two others at large.

Klara Pieschel, whose janitor husband spied for Russia, caused a stir at a 1965 French embassy reception by embracing the guest of honor, Konrad Adenauer (left).

CIA's 'Biggest Catch' Tells Of Espionage in W. Germany

By Dan Morgan
Washington Post Foreign Service

BONN, Nov. 4—Somewhere in the Washington area this weekend Yevgeny Evgenyvich Runge, 39, has come to the end of his journey.

It was a journey that lifted him out of the obscurity of his Ukrainian homeland, took him through four identities and brought him finally into contact with the secrets of at least three governments.

Since 1949 Runge—alias Willy Gast, alias Heinz Mormann, alias Major Maximov—has been a professional Russian spy, but not of the ordinary sort.

In the view of Western intelligence authorities, his surrender to the American Central Intelligence Agency in West Berlin sometime in the last 45 days marks the most important catch of a Communist operative since World War II.

Agents Pinpointed

According to these sources, the story he is now telling has revealed details about the Soviet spy-training center in Karlshorst in East Berlin; has proved conclusively that the Soviet Union operates its own incredibly intricate spy network in West Germany, separate from East Germany's; has indicated that the Allied contingency plan for West Berlin has been handed over to the Russians, and has pinpointed other agents in West Germany, including present or former employes of Bonn's Foreign Ministry.

But in the view of some intelligence experts Runge's main value may lie in the detailed information he is providing about the little-known techniques, work and training of a rare type of espionage specialist — the "illegal" agent who melts into his environment.

Unlike such big catches as Yuri Loginov in South Africa, Runge never carried a diplomatic passport, never came in contact with the Soviet Union's corps of "diplomatic spies" and never went near an embassy, as far as Western investigators can tell.

Faded Into Society

For him, diplomatic cover was unnecessary. His cover, which he used from the time he entered West Germany in 1955 until 1967, was his ability to fade grayly into German society.

How many more Russian agents like him are now operating in West Germany are unknown, but the number probably is not very large.

Becoming accepted into German life was not particularly difficult for Runge. He was born in Novo Soleyoye, a "Volga German" from a part of the Ukraine where the German language and German mannerisms have persisted for centuries. (In the Babel of German dialects in postwar West Germany, his was not a problem.)

After the Nisei-like displacement of Volga Germans by Russians during World War II, Runge wandered into East Germany and became an interpreter for the Russian occupation forces. The chronology of events after that has been made available by Western intelligence "in the public interest."

Recruited by KGB

In 1949, according to his statement to investigators, he was recruited by the KGB (Interior Ministry's state intelligence apparatus).

In 1952, after "Basic Training" he began three years of preparations for his West German assignment. The length has surprised even Western intelligence sources with high regard for the thoroughness of Soviet methods.

He was given his first new identity—that of Willy Gast and a West German passport and documentation were obtained with the help of agents in the West Berlin police department.

The KGB supplied him a wife, an East German called Valentina, and in 1955 the couple entered West Germany. In the years that followed, Runge set himself up in business as a jukebox and pinball-machine salesman, living and operating mainly in the Frankfurt and Cologne areas.

He sold the business at a profit before turning himself in to American authorities.

First Contact

Shortly after his arrival Runge made his first contac

See SPY, F5, Col. 1

with a man identified by Western sources as "Margraf." This man contacted his sister, Klara Pieschel, and she in turn persuaded her husband, Leonard, a janitor at the French embassy in Bonn, to work for Runge.

In raids following Runge's defection last month, Pieschel was arrested on suspicion of stealing a key to the embassy safe and stealing NATO documents.

In 1959, Runge himself was contacted by an East German agent named Heinz Suetterlin, who was posing as a photographer. According to intelligence sources, Suetterlein had been sent to West Germany with the names of three secretaries in the West German Foreign Office and orders to marry one. He selected a brunette named Leonore, who was working at an insignificant job in Lille, France.

Shortly thereafter she was transfered to the Foreign Office in Bonn. This convinced investigators that her career had either been manipulated or accurately foreseen by agents within the Foreign Office. These agents, it is said, have now been identified and have confessed.

Takes Documents Home

The new Mrs. Suetterlin was assigned to work in the office of a foreign service administrator identified as Knut Neisse. In the early 1960s she began taking documents from the office at lunchtime to be photographed by her husband at home.

The film was then passed on to Runge, who mailed it to contacts in Switzerland and Austria. The contacts handed the film over to the Russian embassies in their countries.

In late 1960 or early 1961, a curious event took place, according to statements by Runge. He was told to "forget about" the Pieschel ring, which he carefully established, and concentrate entirely on the activities of the Suetterlins.

Analysts are not sure why. The janitor Pieschel may have been turned over to another "illegal" without Runge's knowledge is (something Pieschel denies) or the French information may have suddenly become available from some other source. Even the possibility that the Russians halted the French Embassy operation for fear of endangering rapidly improving relations with France has not been entirely rejected.

The importance of the Foreign Office documents photographed by the Suetterlins cannot be weighed because the films were usually mailed off unseen by Runge.

West German Foreign Office spokesmen have sought to minimize their importance. But it is known that "hundreds" of documents were copied, including cables, personnel files of foreign service officers would be of special interest because of leads on homosexuality, drinking problems and other weaknesses that would alert Soviet agents in the field to vulnerable "targets."

In Moscow, the agent and his family requested a final trip to West Berlin to conclude affairs before a long assignment in Moscow. Runge used this opportunity to turn himself in.

Why Moscow wanted to end such an allegedly productive ring as Runge's is unknown, but his recall raises the possibility that he was under suspicion.

On Oct. 12, Bonn police arrested Pieschel and the Suetterlins. By that time, Runge and his family had already been flown to America. Then, early on the morning of Oct. 16, Leonore Suetterlin hanged herself with her pajamas in the Cologne Women's Reformatory. Authorities said she was distressed to learn that Suetterlin had been instructed to marry her.

One indication of the document's value is that on Dec. 18, 1964, Runge was presented Medal for Distinguished Service No. 089260, Committee of State Security by the USSR. The medal was bestowed on him by Vladimir Semichastny, chief of the KGB.

Runge presumably was decorated during one of his several trips to the Soviet Union, which he took under the name of Soviet Army Major Maximov. For his trips to East Germany, he had another passport bearing the name of Heinz Mormann.

Was Runge a double agent, recruited years ago by the Americans to keep an eye both on the Russians and the West Germans? Western intelligence sources insist he was not, although how he was spotted and contacted by the Central Intelligence Agency (or when remains officially unexplained.

What is known, according to intelligence sources, is that last spring Runge, his wife and their eight-year-old son were ordered back to the Soviet Union. On the way through East Berlin, Runge did a stint as an instructor at the Karlshorst Training School. Neither the names nor the nationalities of the 30 recruits there were revealed to Runge, but he has supplied his questioners with descriptions of them.

NY Times 10 Nov 67

Defection of Soviet Spy Is Exploited in U.S.

A West German passport issued Jan. 24, 1967, to Lieut. Col. Yevgeny V. Runge under the name of Willi Gast

Intelligence Circles Use Case In Fight Against Soft Line

By BENJAMIN WELLES
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 9—The defection of Lieut. Col. Yevgeny Y. Runge, a 39-year-old Soviet intelligence officer, is regarded as a windfall by United States intelligence officials.

They are utilizing the case to pursue a threefold objective: to expose what they consider a new emphasis on the uses of "illegal" agents in Soviet espionage, to promote closer cooperation among Western security services and to counteract what they consider the tendency of some American officials, intent on "building bridges" to the Soviet Union, to minimize Soviet espionage practices.

Colonel Runge, an ethnic German from the Ukraine, defected last month. He took with him his wife, Walentina, and their 7-year-old son, Andrei, after having posed 11 years as a vending-machine dealer in West Germany as a cover for his espionage activities.

As a result of his defection, five of his subordinates have been apprehended in West Germany. The information he supplied led to the apprehension or surveillance of at least 20 more agents, and the trail may eventually lead to the United States.

Intelligence officers here and in Western Europe regard the Runge case as unique because, they say, the spy's disclosures have so incriminated his subordinates that they are talking freely. In other cases it was the subordinates who first defected and then exposed senior officers such as Col. Rudolf I. Abel, who was arrested in New York in 1957, and Gordon A. Lonsdale, who spied in Britain.

These two maintained a tight-lipped silence during years of imprisonment until they were exchanged for Western agents held in the Soviet Union.

Equally significant is the intimate glimpse that Colonel Runge's defection provides into the warfare waged between the Soviet and American espionage establishments. Most defectors are kept hidden by the Central Intelligence Agency for months even years, while they provide information. After all the information possible has been gleaned, the defector is allowed to resettle with a new name and identity.

But Colonel Runge, almost from the start, was involved in the incessant global rivalry between the Soviet and United States intelligence services, some of it covert, some open to view.

Fortunately for the C.I.A., his defection coincided with a desire of at least some United States intelligence officials to counter the international attention, much of it favorable, surrounding the Soviet Union's 50th anniversary. It also gave United States intelligence men a chance to focus public attention on what they consider a growing emphasis on the use of "illegal" Soviet agents around the world.

'Legal' Agents Balanced

Although there is no agreement, the C.I.A. and the Soviet intelligence apparatus attempt to keep the number of their respective "legal" agents —those attached to embassies or official missions—in rough balance. These agents are generally known. An American intelligence officer said recently on leaving a private home:

"I can get in my car and drive away safely. If anything happens to me, they know we'll do the same to them."

But agents who enter a foreign country illegally and eign country illegally and operate secretly under the disguise are another problem. These agents, who assume fictious identities and backgrounds, are what intelligence officials call "illegals."

In focusing on the Soviet Union's use of "illegals", United States intelligence officials insist that they do not use this type of agent and that, unlike the Soviet Union, they have no spies who are trained for years and then reside abroad under assumed names and nationalities. What the American intelligence apparatus does use, they say, is "indigenous" agents, who are citizens of another country working for the United States.

Undoubtedly, Colonel Runge's defection has been useful to Western intelligence in drawing attention to any expansion of the Soviet Union's "illegal" network. His importance as a purveyor of information is less clear. Some Western intelligence officers consider him on a par with Abel and Lonsdale. Others, knowledgeable about intelligence practices, openly wonder why Colonel Runge would have been surfaced so quickly and discussed so thoroughly if he were indeed of that caliber.

PU 1st ad

Colonel Runge is reported to have told his interrogators that the "illegal" network is being expanded especially in areas with effective counterintelligence services such as the United States, Japan, the British Commonwealth and Western Europe.

Reasons for Publicity

In publicizing the Runge case, intelligence officials here disavow any desire of reviving the "cold war" mentality. But they are evidently concerned about some State Department officials who are so intent on steps to improve relations with the Soviet Union by stressing such "positive" steps as increased trade, space and nuclear control accords, and periodic consultations on such matters as the potential threat from China that they advocate minimizing news of such "negative" factors as espionage and defections.

Against this background, Colonel Runge's successful career as an "illegal" in West Germany is being presented by the intelligence community here as support for assertions that "hundreds" of such agents are at work in the United States and in other countries.

Elements in the intelligence community have long believed that some American political officials in their desire to "build bridges" have underestimated hostile aspects of Soviet policy, including espionage.

These sources also fear that the security agencies of other Western countries have not sufficiently recognized the threat posed by "illegal" agents.

"Illegals now form the bigger part of Soviet intelligence," a senior American official remarked. "Few governments realize how extensive and serious this apparatus has become."

Colonel Runge's own decision to defect began to take shape last July and August when, according to the account he is reported to have given American interrogators, he and his family returned from West Germany to the Soviet Union for a vacation at an intelligence officers' retreat at Gelendzhik, Black Sea resort in the Caucasus, and in preparation for a new assignment.

It was then that he and his strong-willed wife began debating the life they had led for 11 years in West Germany as Mr. and Mrs. Willi Kurt Gast, "illegal" agents in charge of two espionage rings. Although they had been successful in stealing secret Western documents and had been decorated for their work, the Runges began to question their future as spies.

In Moscow they learned that their next assignment would involve learning English, the acquisition of a new legend — false names and personal backgrounds — and eventually separation from their son, who would have to be left behind in a Moscow boarding school.

The Runges have given other reasons for their defection: weariness with their clandestine life, the ever-present fear of detection, irritation with the bureaucracy of the Soviet intelligence apparatus, and the softening effect of long life in the West.

The interrogators believe that the thought of leaving their son was the principal reason for their defection.

With the decision made, Colonel Runge took advantage of an opportunity to photograph his personnel file to obtain proof of his identity to show Western intelligence agents.

During his Moscow visit he was awarded the Victory Medal of World War II at a ceremony in a hideaway house in Vostaniya Square, near the United States Embassy. The award certificate was signed by Maj. Gen. Vasily V. Mozzhechkov, a deputy chief of the foreign intelligence directorate of the State Security Committee.

General Mozzhechkov was in the news last spring when he traveled on a false diplomatic passport to the United Nations and came to Washington during the Cherry Blossom Festival. His identity was exposed in the American press and he returned soon thereafter to Moscow.

The Runges faced a problem in fleeing. According to Western intelligence sources, the Soviet State Security Committee holds a family in hostage to help prevent defections when a change in assignments may strain the agent's loyalty.

Colonel Runge told his interrogators that he succeeded in avoiding this procedure through

the personal intervention of Yuri V. Andropov, chairman of the Soviet intelligence agency. Colonel Runge is said to have told Mr. Andropov that failure of Mrs. Runge or their son to return from an ostensibly normal holiday and business trip might have puzzled neighbors and local shopkeepers in West Germany.

The fact that Colonel Runge had had many opportunities to defect during his 11 years in West Germany, but never did, may have been a factor in Mr. Andropov's decision to let the entire family return to wind up their personal affairs.

In appearance Colonel Runge is a perfect "illegal," able to blend into any West European or North American crowd. He has no distinguishing marks or scars. He stands 5 feet 8 inches tall, weighs 165 pounds, has dark brown, somewhat curly hair worn short, and has intelligent brown eyes.

According to his interrogators he gave the following account of his life:

Born in 1928 of German extraction in the Ukraine, he was sent to Germany by the invading German forces during World War II. After the war he became a Soviet army interpreter and, in 1949, joined the intelligence service in a similar capacity.

From 1952 to 1955 he trained for a career as an "illegal" agent. He was assigned the legend name of Willi Kurt Gast and, as a "birthplace," the Pomeranian village of Duninowo (the former German Dünnow), in an area that passed from Germany to Poland after World War II. There Soviet intelligence had found a record of a dead woman named Martha Gast, who was to be his late "mother."

Colonel Runge spent two weeks in Duninowo in 1954 to familiarize himself with the house in which he was supposedly raised, with the school, shops and townsfolk. During this period he also practiced high-speed radio transmission.

Next followed training in Moscow in the use of microdots. These are photographs reduced to the size of a period on a typewriter that are virtually undetectable when concealed in an ordinary letter. Colonel Runge also learned surveillance and countersurveillance, secret writing, safe "drops" for messages and "brush" contacts. In such contacts material is passed unobtrusively between two agents as they brush against each other in a public place.

From Moscow Colonel Runge was sent to Leipzig and then to Halle in East Germany before moving on to Munich and Frankfurt in West Germany for advanced training. Unlike most illegal agents he was trained on the job rather than in special schools in Moscow.

Early in 1956 he married Waentina Rusch, an East German woman who had already been recruited into the Soviet intelligence service.

With $1,200 advanced them by the intelligence agency, Mr. and Mrs. "Gast" settled in Cologne and sought to open a dry-cleaning establishment. However the money proved inadequate and they were forced to borrow. In time Colonel Runge switched to the vending-machine business.

His monthly pay as an agent was 380 rubles (about $420), which was deposited to a bank account in his name in Moscow. He supported himself and his family entirely on the proceeds of his West German business. When he returned to Moscow last summer he had to make a detailed financial account to his superiors.

Subordinates Identified

Colonel Runge was first assigned to "run" Leopold Pieschel, a majordomo of the French Embassy in Bonn, who is said to have photographed more than 1,000 secret documents, including codes, before his arrest last month. Colonel Runge says he forwarded the material to agents in Switzerland and Austria for dispatch to Moscow.

Besides Pieschel, his wife, Klara, and her brother, Martin Markgraf, a waiter, also were placed under Colonel Runge's orders in 1956.

By 1959 his three agents were producing such valuable information that he was assigned Heinz Sütterlin, an East German who had been recruited with orders to marry a woman secretary in a key West German ministry. He eventually married Leonore Heinz of the Foreign Ministry, who hanged herself after her arrest last month.

In 1960 Colonel Runge and his wife moved to Frankfurt, where he opened a tavern and where their son was born. Neighbors remember him as a solid family man with a sense of humor who liked to talk science and politics, go dancing and lift a glass or two of beer. Soon he sold the tavern and invested in a slot-machine and juke-box business.

The neighbor who knew Colonel Runge best was Wolfgang Hochrieser, 27, a mechanic who met him in 1960. Mr. Hochrieser made the rounds twice weekly with Mr. "Gast," checking and servicing the vending machines. Last summer when the Runges departed he took over the business.

"I didn't have the slightest idea that Kurt Gast was a spy," Mr. Hochrieser said recently in an interview. "Even after his defection I still didn't associate Runge with the Gast I knew. It was not until I actually saw my name linked with his in the newspapers that I finally realized that Kurt was Runge."

The Runges have now settled down in a hide-out, protected by the C.I.A. The little boy, who finds it still difficult to realize his name is not Gast, plays with children of C.I.A. employes. Day after day Colonel Runge is interrogated as he tries to recall names and incidents that may help Western intelligence.

Colonel Runge is still talking and he is expected to talk for many more months before his memory runs dry.



The New York Times

Organizational chart of the State Security Committee of the Soviet Union, which employs 600,000 to one million people. The First Chief Directorate for Foreign Intelligence, left, is comparable to the Central Intelligence Agency.

Structure of Soviet Intelligence Unit Is Outlined

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 9—The Soviet Union's State Security Committee, which is the nation's principal intelligence agency, employs 600,000 to one million people inside and outside the Soviet Union, according to Western estimates.

Only one of its divisions, the First Chief Directorate for Foreign Intelligence, is comparable in function to the Central Intelligence Agency. This division was the one in charge of Lieut. Col. Yevgeny Y. Runge, an agent who recently defected to the United States.

Other functions handled by the Soviet State Security Committee have their equivalents in the United States in the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Security Agency, the Secret Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Bureau of Customs.

Thus the Soviet agency is also concerned with internal security and subversive activity. When it finds it necessary, it observes Soviet citizens and foreign residents at their places of work and in their private activities.

The agency cracks codes and communications used by other governments, provides bodyguards for high political figures and manages technical laboratories to devise new equipment for intelligence and other purposes. The 200,000 border guards also fall under the control of the security apparatus.

A Museum in Moscow

The organization has its own museum in Moscow, displaying mementoes of past security exploits. The exhibits include the parachute used by the American U-2 pilot, Francis Gary Powers, shot down over the Soviet Union in 1960. The museum is not open to the public.

The agency prints its own house organ, called Chekistsky Sbornik. The magazine has a select and limited circulation.

The present name of the State Security Committee, known in Russian as K. G. B. or Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti, dates from 1954. It is the successor organization to the security apparatus started by Lenin as the Cheka. It was reorganized periodically under different names, represented by the initials G.P.U., N.K.V.D., and M.V.D.

Its officers still refer to themselves as Chekists, a term both fearful and glamorous in the Russian context.

At times in Soviet history the security police have played a powerful role in the nation's politics, notably in the era from 1938 to 1953 when Lavrenti P. Beria headed the apparatus and served as one of Stalin's closest associates.

Beria was executed within months of Stalin's death, and the post-Stalin leaders have shown marked concern about letting the security apparatus ever play the dominant role in policy-making that it achieved [illegible] Gen. Ivan M. Gribanov

Anatoly I. Lazarev

Yuri V. Andropov

Western analysts, however, consider the security agency at least as important as the military in the factional line-up of forces in Soviet politics. No longer an instrument of brute terror, the agency is still an awesome and mysterious organization.

From defectors and other sources, Western intelligence organizations have pieced together the structure of the Soviet agency and identified key personnel.

Officially the agency is a Government organization at ministry level. Since the Soviet Government is secondary at every level to the Communist party structure, the true channel of authority is through the Administrative Organs section of the party's Central Committee secretariat, headed by the general secretary, Leonid I. Brezhnev.

The present chairman of the Soviet agency is a close political ally of Mr. Brezhnev, Yuri V. Andropov, a professional party official. Mr. Andropov was named to this post last May in a shake-up that observers analyzed as a move to bring the agency more closely under Mr. Brezhnev's control.

Structure Is Described

Under the chairman are a series of chief directorates, each headed by an intelligence officer with the rank of major general or lieutenant general.

The First Chief Directorate, headed by Lieut. Gen. Aleksandr M. Sakharovsky, employs about 10,000 persons in the collection and analysis of foreign intelligence.

The Second Chief Directorate is concerned with political subversive activities, economic espionage, sabotage and treason, embezzlement and thefts of government property. Some of its functions therefore correspond to those of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, local police forces and regulatory agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration or the Narcotics Bureau. More than 100,000 agents are believed to

has been the head of the Second Chief Directorate, though recent reports indicate he may have been replaced.

The Third Directorate, headed by Maj. Gen. I. A. Fadeikin, was known during World War II as Smersh, an acronym for Russian words meaning "death to spies." It is charged with counterintelligence within the Soviet armed forces. The State Security Committee is thus the senior partner, over the armed forces' own military intelligence agency, or G.R.U., since the security agents keep the military intelligence itself under surveillance. Counterintelligence in the United States armed services is a responsibility of the services themselves.

The fourth, fifth and sixth directorates are not known to exist now. Formerly they shared in the internal security responsibilities, dividing up political, economic and other crimes that have now been grouped under the Second directorate.

The Seventh Chief Directorate is the division that carries out actual surveillance, the shadowing of suspicious persons, the clandestine penetration of offices and the recruitment of potential agents among foreigners. This division is known to employ 3,000 persons in Moscow alone. Guards at embassies and buildings where foreigners live in the Soviet capital report to the Seventh directorate, headed by Maj. Gen. V. I. Aladin. Government surveillance is carried out mainly by the F. B. I.

The Eighth Chief Directorate, under Maj. Gen. Serafim N. Lyalin, performs functions similar to the National Security Agency of the United States, including code-breaking and surveillance of communications of foreign governments and citizens.

The Ninth Chief Directorate is headed by Maj. Gen. V. Y. Chekalov and provides personal security to leading members of the Soviet Government and party. The Kremlin guards and chauffeurs of official cars are [illegible] functions are handled in the United States by the Secret Service.

A separate division directs the border guards, commanded by Lieut. Gen. Pavel I. Zyryanov. Their closest equivalent in the United States is the Naturalization and Immigration Service. Like the United States Bureau of Customs, the border troops also guard against the importation of subversive literature.

There is an administrative and personnel division that manages the agency's headquarters on Moscow's Dzerzhinsky Square. The headquarters includes Lubyanka prison, where important prisoners are interrogated.

Finally, the agency maintains technical laboratories and research facilities at Buchum, northeast of Moscow, to develop new techniques and devices in surveillance, sabotage and analysis.

The First directorate is directly involved with foreign governments, for this is the division that dispatches agents abroad.

Under General Sakharovsky are three deputy directors, Maj. Gen. Vasily V. Mozzhechkov, who was publicly identified last April while visiting the United States under a pseudonym; Maj. Gen. Mikhail S. Tsymbal, who is known to have made periodic trips outside the Soviet Union under the name Rogov, and Maj. Gen. Ivan I. Agayants, newly promoted to the post of deputy director.

General Mozzhechkov is believed to be in charge of personnel and administration. General Tsymbal was formerly head of the directorate's department overseeing "illegals," agents who live abroad under the deep cover with no apparent link to the Soviet Union. The present head of the "illegals" department is Anatoly I. Lazarev.

General Agayants was for many years the head of the "disinformation" department of the First directorate, the apparatus charged with disseminating false or misleading information with an intent to deceive foreign countries. The department is reports to have a staff of 40 or 50 writers and editors in Moscow.

The work of the First directorate is known to be divided among 15 departments, including "disinformation" and "illegals." The others deal with specific geographic areas.

The 13th department has a special notoriety, for it engages in the violent aspects of intelligence such as assassinations, terrorism and kidnappings. Its head has been identified as a man named Rodin, who has traveled abroad under the pseudonym Nikolai B. Korovin.

In Western intelligence parlance this activity is called "executive action." The Soviet name is more explicit, "mokrie dela," a slang phrase meaning "bloody business."

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PARADE

SPIES & MONEY Why do spies defect? For money, ideology, women?

Yevgeny Runge, 40, a Soviet agent who defected to the United States last October after serving the Soviets for 12 years in West Germany, says poverty is a major reason.

Runge, Ukranian-born Russian of German descent, said he defected to the U.S. where he is living under a new identity, because the Soviets are cheapskates who keep their retired spies in a state of penury.

"I know," he says, "A retired female agent who served the Soviet Union well. She now receives a monthly pension of $25, not even enough to buy the medicine she needs. I was at a Polish holiday home for retired KGB officers, and they were all so poor that they stole from each other."

Runge is the so-called "master spy," who betrayed Soviet spy rings in the West German foreign office and the French Embassy in Bonn. The CIA saw to it that he was granted political asylum in this country.

PASSPORT OF YEVGENY RUNGE

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